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“Women Directors”: A Term of Art Showcasing 
the Need for Meaningful Gender Diversity on 
Corporate Boards 
Sonja S. Carlson1 
INTRODUCTION 
What’s the point in pouring a fortune into educating girls, and then 
watching them exceed boys at almost every level, if, when it 
comes to appointing business leaders in top companies, these are 
drawn from just half the population – friends who have been 
recruited on fishing and hunting trips or from within a small circle 
of acquaintances? 
—Ansgar Gabrielsen, Former Minister of Trade and 
Industry, Norway2 
While women comprise nearly half of the American labor force,3 looking 
to the corporate boardrooms of America’s Fortune 500 companies,4 a mere 
                                                            
1 Sonja Carlson is a 2013 JD candidate at Seattle University School of Law, where she 
serves as the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Scholar for the Berle Center on Corporations, Law and 
Society. She received her BA in Economics from Columbia University in 2004. A special 
thanks to Dean Mark Niles, Professor Charles O’Kelley, Mr. Bob Menanteaux, and R.G. 
Carlson Phillips for their support and encouragement. 
2 Nicki Gilmour, Why Accountability Is What Matters: Achieving Critical Mass with 
Targets or Quotas, GLASS HAMMER (Jan. 21, 2010, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.theglasshammer.com/news/2010/01/21/why-accountability-is-what-matters-
achieving-critical-mass-with-targets-or-quotas/ (quoting Ansgar Gabrielsen, former 
Norwegian politician for the Conservative Party who, as Minister of Trade and Industry, 
drafted the legislation mandating quotas for gender diversity on corporate boards). 
3 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 1 
(2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-intro-2011.pdf (women comprised 47 
percent of the American labor force in 2010). 
4 “Fortune magazine’s ranking of the top 500 U.S. incorporated companies filing 
financial statements . . . is based on each company’s gross annual revenue. Included in 
the list are public companies, private companies, and cooperatives that file a 10-K with 
the SEC, and mutual insurance companies that file with state regulators.” NANCY M. 
CARTER & HARVEY M. WAGNER, THE BOTTOM LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND 
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16.1 percent of directors are women.5 In both 2010 and 2011, less than one-
fifth of Fortune 500 companies had 25 percent or more women directors.6 
Just three companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500)—Avon 
Products, Estée Lauder, and Macy’s—have boards in which women hold 
more than 40 percent of the seats.7 Furthermore, women hold a mere 2.6 
percent of board chairmanships.8 Forty-seven, or 9.4 percent, of S&P 500 
companies have no female directors at all, including Discovery 
Communications, Inc., co-owner of Oprah Winfrey’s OWN cable channel, 
and retailer Urban Outfitters, Inc.9 
Such statistics are particularly noteworthy given that the board of 
directors is so central to a corporation’s strategic leadership that it is 
considered “the epicenter of U.S. corporate governance.”10 While 
                                                                                                                              
WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION ON BOARDS (2004–2008) 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.catalyst.org/file/445/the_bottom_line_corporate_performance_and_women’s
_representation_on_boards_(2004–2008).pdf (citing Fortune 500: FAQ Definitions and 
Explanations, CNNMONEY (May 3, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/ 
fortune500/2010/faq/). 
5 CATALYST, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE (Dec. 14, 
2011), available at http://www.catalyst.org/publication/219/statistical-overview-of-
women-in-the-workplace [hereinafter STATISTICAL OVERVIEW] (citing BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, Table 3: Employment Status of the 
Civilian Noninstitutional Population by Age, Sex, and Race, Annual Averages 2010 
(2011) [hereinafter POPULATION SURVEY]). See also CATALYST, WOMEN IN U.S. 
INFORMATION (Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://www.catalyst.org/publication/496/ 
women-in-us-information [hereinafter WOMEN IN U.S.] (Data from 2011 also reveals that 
women constitute only 12.2 percent of executive officers and 3.3 percent of CEOs.). 
6 RACHEL SOARES ET AL., CATALYST CENSUS: FORTUNE 500 WOMEN BOARD 
DIRECTORS 1 (2011), available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/533/2011_fortune_500_ 
census_wbd.pdf. 
7 Joel Stonington, Boys-Only Boards: Where the Women Aren’t at the Top, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 27, 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43526947/ 
ns/business-us_business/t/boys-only-boards-where-women-arent-top/from/ 
toolbar#.TvotapgW994. 
8 Id. (citing Catalyst statistics). 
9 Jeff Green, Women Lose Out on U.S. Boards as Europeans Get Quota Help, 
BLOOMBERG, June 16, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-16/women-
losing-out-on-u-s-boards-as-europe-gets-help-from-quotas.html?cmpid=msnbc. 
10 JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES 
BROKEN 51 (2008). 
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boardroom diversity11 has been a topic of discussion for some time, in 
recent years it has been the focus of increasing attention from both 
companies and governments.12   
Broadly speaking, arguments for increased gender diversity fall into one 
of two categories: ethical or economic.13 Ethical arguments present the lack 
of women directors in terms of the immorality of gender discrimination, 
advocating for increased gender diversity in order to “achieve a more 
equitable outcome for society.”14 In contrast, economic arguments are 
“based on the proposition that firms which fail to select the most able 
candidates for the board of directors damage their financial performance”—
the so-called “business case” for gender diversity.15 
Building on contemporary discourse regarding the desirability of 
meaningful gender diversity in the boardroom, this article suggests that the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ought to introduce a more 
robust version of its diversity-related 2010 Proxy Disclosure 
Enhancements16 to better address gender diversity. Such an amended 
disclosure requirement would (1) define “diversity” to explicitly include 
gender diversity, (2) require corporations to have a diversity policy in place 
and to disclose such policy to shareholders, and (3) potentially require a 
nonbinding “say-on-diversity” shareholder vote. 
                                                            
11 While “boardroom diversity” can be used to refer to a broad range of characteristics, 
such as ethnicity, gender, age, professional experience, and geography, this article uses 
the term to refer specifically to gender diversity in the boardroom. 
12 See, e.g., DELOITTE GLOBAL CENTER FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, WOMEN IN 
THE BOARDROOM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (2011) (on file with author) (reviewing the 
approaches of numerous countries to boardroom diversity, which include everything 
“from voluntary initiatives, to ‘comply or explain’ initiatives aligned with local corporate 
governance codes, to required disclosure about diversity policies, to legal requirements 
with specific quotas”) [hereinafter DELOITTE GLOBAL]. 
13 Kevin Campbell & Antonio Mínguez-Vera, Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and 
Firm Financial Performance, 83 J. BUS. ETHICS 435, 439 (2008). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 See Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(1–2) (2012). 
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Part I examines the available rationales in support of gender diversity, 
focusing primarily on the business rationale because it is directly linked to 
the dominant model of corporate governance: shareholder primacy. 
Included is a discussion highlighting the importance of achieving a “critical 
mass” of women directors, as well as the drawbacks of “tokenistic” 
appointments. Part II summarizes regulations aimed at boardroom gender 
diversity in the international context and examines the SEC’s 2010 Proxy 
Disclosure Enhancements. Part III analyzes the scope of the SEC’s 
regulatory authority and, in light of the advantages of increased gender 
diversity in the boardroom, suggests a more robust version of the 2010 
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements. Finally, Part IV engages in a preliminary 
investigation of the potentially positive labor market effects that stem from 
gender diversity in the boardroom, suggesting that this is an area for further 
research. 
I. THE BUSINESS RATIONALE FOR GENDER DIVERSITY IN THE 
BOARDROOM: FROM TOKEN TO CRITICAL MASS 
Delaware, the leading authority on matters of corporate law, mandates 
that “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by 
or under the direction of a board of directors.”17 While there are numerous 
corporate governance models, the dominant model today is that of 
shareholder primacy—the central role of the board of directors is 
shareholder wealth maximization.18 The shareholder primacy norm is 
                                                            
17 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2012). 
18 See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 
(1998). 
 
Although the shareholder primacy norm has had myriad formulations over 
time, the one most often quoted by modern scholars comes from the well-
known case Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised 
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generally assumed to be “a major factor considered by boards of directors of 
publicly traded corporations in making ordinary business decisions.”19 To 
the extent that the board’s obligation to maximize shareholder wealth 
supersedes or excludes any broader social responsibility—a view espoused 
by the late Nobel Prize-winning economist, Milton Friedman—a business 
rationale must justify corporate conduct.20 
Numerous empirical studies have linked greater gender diversity on 
corporate boards to stronger financial performance.21 InterOrganization 
Network (ION), an organization advocating for the advancement of women 
in the business world,22 contends that “board diversity is no longer a ‘soft 
issue,’ but rather is a solid business strategy that leads to a return on equity, 
                                                                                                                              
in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a 
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the 
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote 
them to other purposes. 
Id. (quoting Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)). 
19 Id. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the 
Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 717 (1996) (“the shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . 
has been fully internalized by American managers”).  
20 Thomas Lee Hazen, Diversity on Corporate Boards: Limits of the Business Case and 
the Connection Between Supporting Rationales and the Appropriate Response of the 
Law, 89 N.C. L. REV. 887, 889–90 (2011) (citing Milton Friedman, The Social 
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, §6 
(Magazine), at 32) (Thomas Lee Hazen’s article “explores the limits of the business case, 
some of the alternative rationales for increasing diversity on corporate boards, and the 
extent to which those rationales provide a basis for the law mandating or encouraging 
increased diversity.”). 
21 See, e.g., CARTER & WAGNER, supra note 4. 
22 About Us: Charged for Boardroom Change, INTERORGANIZATION NETWORK, 
http://www.ionwomen.org/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2012).  
Formed in 2004, the InterOrganizationNetwork (ION) consists of 14 regional 
organizations in the United States representing more than 10,000 women in 
business across a wide range of industries. Through ION, these women 
combine their energies in advocating the advancement of women to positions 
of power in the business world, especially to boards of directors and executive 
suites. 
Id. 
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return on sales, and return on invested capital.”23 According to a recent 
report from the Deloitte Global Center for Corporate Governance, including 
individuals with a diversity of backgrounds on corporate boards could 
“improve these boards’ functioning [because] harnessing strength from a 
variety of backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives allows boards to 
bring a more diverse perspective to problems.”24 
A. Business Rationale 
More diverse boards tend to be more highly qualified than less diverse 
boards.25 At least in part, this is because greater gender diversity implies 
that the available “talent pool” was more broadly considered during 
selection processes.26 Given corporate governance’s focus on wealth 
maximization, it is unsurprising that selecting “the most able managers and 
[making them] accountable to investors” is believed to result in “good” 
corporate governance structures.27 
While this article does not attempt a comprehensive review of the 
ongoing debate surrounding gender diversity in the boardroom, it does 
endeavor to discuss some of the key arguments supporting the “business 
case” for increased gender diversity in the boardroom. Specifically, 
                                                            
23 Tina Vasquez, SEC Changes Help Women in the Boardroom, GLASS HAMMER, Feb. 
2, 2010, http://www.theglasshammer.com/news/2010/02/02/sec-changes-help-women-in-
the-boardroom/. 
24 DELOITTE GLOBAL, supra note 12. 
25 See, e.g., FEEDBACK STATEMENT: GENDER DIVERSITY ON BOARDS, THE FINANCIAL 
REPORTING COUNCIL LIMITED 1, 1 (2011), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/ 
getattachment/ade9464e-2195-4ce7-b99d-dabaec94e870/Feedback-Statement-Gender-
Diversity-on-Boards.aspx [hereinafter FEEDBACK STATEMENT]; id. at 4 (“low 
percentages of women on boards may demonstrate a failure to make full use of the talent 
pool”).  
26 See id. at 4 (“low percentages of women on boards may demonstrate a failure to make 
full use of the talent pool”).  
27 Claude Francoeur, Réal Labelle & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, Gender Diversity in 
Corporate Governance and Top Management, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 83, 84 (2008) (quoting 
Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 2 (2001) (1999 Presidential 
address to the Econometric Society) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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corporations with diverse boards may enjoy enhanced profitability because 
greater gender diversity leads to better decision-making,28 improved 
performance of monitoring functions,29 and stronger market penetration.30  
The dangers that stem from homogenous boards (i.e., boards with low 
levels of gender diversity) were highlighted by the 2008 financial crisis. 
Angela Knight, chief executive officer of the British Bankers’ Association, 
reflected on these issues: “If boards all look the same, will they end up 
making the same kinds of decisions? After the banking crisis, the question 
was asked whether there would have been so much groupthink if there had 
been broader [female] representation on boards.”31 Richard A. Bennett32 
suggests, “[d]uring the financial crisis, we saw examples of boards that 
were composed of members who were too similar in background and that 
too often may breed ‘groupthink’. Those boards would have benefited from 
                                                            
28 See, e.g., Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13, at 440 (“it is argued that diversity 
can enhance problem-solving as the variety of perspectives that emerges from a more 
diverse board means that more alternatives are evaluated.”). 
29 See, e.g., id. at 435. 
30 See, e.g., Stonington, supra note 7. 
‘It makes no sense not to have diversity on the board,’ says [Aída] Alvarez. At 
Walmart, she says, it’s sound business to have women on the board, not least 
because more than half the customers and employees are women. The large 
public company doesn’t exist, Alvarez says, that doesn’t have women as end 
users or investors. 
Id. (Dr. Aída Álvarez is a director on the boards of Walmart and Union Bank; she 
formerly served as an administrator for the US Small Business Administration); 
Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13, at 439–40 (“it is argued that greater diversity 
promotes a better understanding of the marketplace by matching the diversity of a firm’s 
directors to the diversity of its potential customers and employees, thereby increasing its 
ability to penetrate markets”). 
31 Dalia Fahmy, Women on Board; A U.K. Initiative Puts a Spotlight on the Dearth of 
Female Directors and Gets Corporate Executives To Commit To Hard Targets for 
Improvement, U.S. BANKER, Mar. 2011, at 32. 
32 Richard A. Bennett is Executive Chairman of GovernanceMetrics International (GMI), 
a global leader in corporate governance research and risk rating. About GMI, 
GOVERNANCEMETRICS INTERNATIONAL, http://www.gmiratings.com/about.aspx (last 
visited May 27, 2012). 
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having a more dynamic and broad-ranging composition.”33 Others have 
proposed that “critical mass”34 is itself a business strategy that can be 
employed to combat the type of “groupthink” that contributed to the 2008 
financial crisis.35 
Assuming that increased gender diversity can be equated with an 
increased variety of perspectives—a proposition related to the ensuing 
discussion of “critical mass”—then such an increase in gender diversity 
means a concomitant increase in the range of alternatives evaluated during a 
board’s decision-making process.36 Evaluating a broader range of ideas 
implies that boards will both make more informed decisions, and, in at least 
some instances, reach substantively better decisions based on ideas that had 
previously gone unconsidered. Gender diversity in the boardroom can aid in 
the fulfillment of directors’ fiduciary duties because considering a diversity 
of perspectives during the decision-making process can help a corporation 
achieve optimal long-term and risk-adjusted returns.37 
                                                            
33 Press Announcement, GovernanceMetrics International, GMI Launches Diverse 
Director Database (Sept. 26, 2011), available at http://www3.gmiratings.com/wp-
content/themes/gmi/images/pdf/1753gmipr3d.pdf (quoting Richard A. Bennett, Executive 
Chairman, GMI); see also FEEDBACK STATEMENT supra note 25 (suggesting that “a lack 
of gender diversity around the board table may weaken the board by encouraging ‘group 
think’”). 
34 Critical mass theory, as articulated by Rosabeth Moss Kanter and Mark Granovetter, 
suggests that “the nature of group interactions depends upon size. When the size of the 
subgroup reaches a certain threshold, or critical mass, the subgroup’s degree of influence 
increases. In other words . . . when the minority group reaches critical mass, a qualitative 
change will take place in the nature of group interactions.” Mariateresa Torchia, Andrew 
Calabrò & Morten Huse, Women Directors on Corporate Boards: From Tokenism to 
Critical Mass, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 299, 302 (2011). See generally ROSABETH MOSS 
KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977); Mark Granovetter, Threshold 
Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOC. 1420 (1978). 
35 Gilmour, supra note 2. 
36 See, e.g., Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13, at 440 (“it is argued that diversity 
can enhance problem-solving as the variety of perspectives that emerges from a more 
diverse board means that more alternatives are evaluated.”). 
37 Press Announcement, supra note 33 (quoting Richard A. Bennett, Executive 
Chairman, GMI). 
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Having a robust decision-making process can also facilitate a board’s 
ability to adeptly perform its monitoring role.38 Such role represents an 
important control mechanism in corporate governance.39 The board’s role as 
monitor of executive management derives from agency theory.40 Within 
legal scholarship, agency theory dominates discourse on the role of the 
board of directors.41 Assuming rational, self-interested actors, the separation 
of ownership from control inherent in the modern corporate form 
necessarily implies that management (i.e., agent) will not always act in the 
best interest of shareholders (i.e., principal).42 Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner 
C. Means underscored the dangers that stem from the separation of 
ownership and control.43 They theorized that the potentially adverse effects 
for shareholders could be reduced if boards attempted to minimize agency 
costs by monitoring management.44 Notably, some scholars highlight a link 
between women directors and overall board independence, suggesting that 
diverse boards may result in more effective monitoring because “women are 
more inclined to ask questions that would not be asked by male directors.”45 
                                                            
38 Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13, at 435. 
39 Id. 
40 Nicola Faith Sharpe, Process Over Structure: An Organizational Behavior Approach 
To Improving Corporate Boards, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 261, 269–70 (2012).  
41 Id. (Two other important theories of the role of the board of directors are the “resource 
dependency theory” and the “stewardship theory.”). 
42 Id. at 270–72. 
43 Id. at 270 (citing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 121 (1932)).  
44 Id. at 270 (citing BERLE & MEANS, supra note 43). Agency costs are defined as “the 
sum of the monitoring and bonding costs, plus any residual loss, incurred to prevent 
shirking by agents.” STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 
35–36 (2002) (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976)). 
45 Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13, at 440 (citing David Carter, Betty J. 
Simkins & W. Gary Simpson, Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value, 
38 FIN. REV. 33 (2003)) (noting, however, that Carter et al. also “point out that a fresh 
perspective may not necessarily result in more effective monitoring if female board 
members are marginalised and conclude that there is no a priori reason to expect greater 
gender diversity to enhance board monitoring”). 
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Finally, from a broader perspective, as a corporation’s percentage of 
female directors becomes more proportionate to its percentage of female 
customers and employees, the corporation is better able to understand the 
marketplace.46 An improved marketplace understanding can facilitate a 
corporation’s market penetration,47 thereby increasing corporate profits and 
shareholder wealth. In considering public feedback to proposed 
amendments to the UK Corporate Governance Code, the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC)48 stated that boards with no, or very few, female 
directors “may be weak in terms of connectivity with, or understanding of 
customers and workforce.”49 On this side of the Atlantic, Aída M. Álvarez, 
a director on Walmart’s board, expressed a similar viewpoint: because 
women constitute over half of Walmart’s customers and employees, in 
terms of sound business policy, it simply “makes no sense not to have 
diversity on the board.”50 Furthermore, gender diversity in the boardroom is 
a broadly applicable business policy because all large public companies 
have female end-users or investors.51 
B. The Statistics 
The limited extent of female representation in the boardroom has made it 
difficult for researchers to conclusively determine the effects of boardroom 
diversity.52 In the United States, for example, it has been difficult to find 
                                                            
46 Id. at 439–40. 
47 Id. 
48 As the United Kingdom’s independent regulator, the FRC is responsible for 
“promoting high quality corporate governance and reporting to foster investment.” About 
the FRC, FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org.uk/about/ (last visited 
June 4, 2012). 
49 FEEDBACK STATEMENT, supra note 25, at 4. 
50 Stonington, supra note 7 (quoting Álvarez). 
51 Id. (summarizing Álvarez’s statement). 
52 See, e.g., Charlotte Villiers, Achieving Gender Balance in the Boardroom: Is it Time 
for Legislative Action in the UK?, 30 LEGAL STUD. 533, 545 (2010) (“The effect of 
diversity has not been fully tested because diversity has not yet been solidly achieved, so 
much of the business case is therefore speculative.”). 
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adequately sized samples of corporations with varying levels of boardroom 
diversity. Empirical findings have tended to be mixed: a causal relationship 
between gender diversity and firm performance has not been consistently 
identifiable.53 A number of recent studies, however, have not only 
convincingly established a strong correlation between increased gender 
diversity and enhanced financial performance, but have also made a 
colorable case for a causal relationship.54 
A recent Catalyst55 study found a statistically significant correlation 
between Fortune 500 companies’ financial performance and higher levels 
of gender diversity in the boardroom.56 Looking to the companies’ 
percentages of women on corporate boards (WOCB),57 the study compared 
                                                            
53 See e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Showcasing: The Positive Spin, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1055, 
1077 (2011) (“The research with respect to the effects of diversity in corporate 
boardrooms is . . . mixed and inconclusive.”); see also Lissa Lamkin Broome, John M. 
Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Does Critical Mass Matter? Views from the Boardroom, 
34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1049, 1079–80 (2011) (suggesting that while increased gender 
diversity could “enhance opportunities for collaboration and support . . . other scenarios 
are plausible,” especially in light of some women directors’ apparent embrace of their 
“first and only” status); Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Re-visited: New Rationale, 
Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 855, 861–64 (2011) (finding that while many 
empirical studies have found a positive correlation between boardroom diversity and 
improved financial performance, other studies suggest that there is no causal link, and at 
least one study has suggested a negative correlation); James A. Fanto, Lawrence M. 
Solan & John M. Darley, Justifying Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 901, 902–03 (2011) 
(noting the inherent difficulties in designing empirical studies that measure the effects of 
boardroom diversity on firm performance, emphasizing the “impossibly long: causal 
chain between board composition and shareholder value”). 
54 See, e.g., Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13; see also Claude Francoeur, Réal 
Labelle & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, Gender Diversity in Corporate Governance and 
Top Management, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 83, 83–84 (2008) (such firms experienced “returns 
of 0.17% monthly, intuitively amounting to a 6% return over a 3-year period”). 
55 “Founded in 1962, Catalyst is the leading nonprofit membership organization 
expanding opportunities for women and business.” About Us, CATALYST, INC., 
http://www.catalyst.org/page/59/about-us (last visited June 4, 2012). 
56 CARTER & WAGNER, supra note 4, at 1. 
57 For usage of the term “WOCB,” see, e.g., Siri Terjesen, Ruth Sealy & Val Singh, 
Women Directors on Corporate Boards: A Review and Research Agenda, 17 CORP. 
GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 320 (2009). 
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the bottom quartile companies with the top quartile companies.58 It found 
that companies in the top quartile outperformed companies in the bottom 
quartile in two of the three performance measures—return on sales and 
return on invested capital.59 Return on sales for companies in the top 
quartile was 16 percent greater than for companies in the bottom quartile; 
return on invested capital for companies in the top quartile was 26 percent 
greater than for companies in the bottom quartile.60 
Of even greater note, companies with three or more women directors 
outperformed companies with no women directors at rather astonishing 
rates.61 Over a five-year period, Catalyst found that companies whose 
boards had at least three women directors had a return on sales 84 percent 
greater, a return on invested capital 60 percent greater, and a return on 
equity 46 percent greater than companies with no women directors.62 
Similarly, a 2002 Canadian study found significant differences between 
boards with three or more women and all-male boards in terms of 
nonfinancial performance measures, such as customer and employee 
satisfaction, and corporate social responsibility.63 
Utilizing robust methodology, a recent Spanish study reiterates the 
importance of the male-to-female director ratio, while also rebutting a key 




60 Id. (The study found no statistically significant difference in return on equity between 
the two groups of companies.) 
61 Id. 
62 The study evaluated financial performance from 2005 to 2009. In order to be placed 
into either the “at least three women directors” or “zero women directors” category, each 
company needed to have maintained such levels of female representation for at least four 
of the five years at issue. Id. at 2. 
63 Terjesen et al., supra note 57, at 329 (one such difference was that such boards “are 
significantly more active in promoting nonfinancial performance measures such as 
customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, and gender representation, as well as 
considering measures of innovation and corporate social responsibility”) (citing DAVID 
A.H. BROWN, DEBRA L. BROWN & VANESSA ANASTASOPOULOS, WOMEN ON BOARDS: 
NOT JUST THE RIGHT THING BUT THE ‘BRIGHT’ THING, REPORT 341–402 (2002)). 
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causality.64 The two researchers, Kevin Campbell and Antonio Mínguez-
Vera, found that board diversity65 positively and significantly impacts firm 
value.66 Notably, “the positive relationship observed between gender 
diversity and firm value is due to the presence of female directors affecting 
firm performance rather than the opposite.”67 Utilizing panel data 
methodology, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera were able to control for 
unobservable heterogeneity in the data, something that most published 
studies have failed to take into account.68 By employing a causality test, 
they were able to account for possible endogeneity in the relationship 
between gender diversity and firm performance.69 Their findings suggest 
that the effect of firm value on board diversity is insignificant.70 Improved 
firm performance is due to increased gender diversity.71 
                                                            
64 See Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13. 
65 Board diversity is defined as “the mixture of men and women.” Id. at 446. 
66 Id. at 446–47 (2008) (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera measure board diversity using the 
percentage of women, as well as the Blau and Shannon indices). 
67 Id. (emphasis added). 
68 Id. 
The sample for the panel data analysis comprises non-financial firms listed on 
the continuous market in Madrid during the period from January 1995 to 
December 2000. Due to some limitations in the availability of the data, the 
sample comprises 68 companies and 408 observations. The identities of the 
directors and the dates on which they were appointed were obtained from the 
register of directors of the Spanish Stock Exchange Commission (CNMV), 
which provides details of the dates of appointment and termination of the posts 
of each member of the board of directors of listed companies. From the 
register of directors we also calculated the number of board members. The 
accounting data were obtained from the SABI database [System of Analysis of 
Iberian Balance Sheets, provided by Bureau Van Dijk]. Finally, the number of 
shares and the share prices were obtained from the annual Madrid stock 
exchange list. 
 
Id. at 441. 
69 Id. at 436. 
70 Id. at 446. 
71 Id.  
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A number of other studies have leveraged “critical mass” theory72 in 
order to more objectively analyze the benefits flowing from boardroom 
diversity when women directors assume more than tokenistic roles. Pax 
World Management President and CEO, Joe Keefe, explained that many 
companies have viewed the issue of gender diversity in terms of box 
checking: “We have one woman on our board now, so we can check that 
box off; we have quote unquote gender diversity.”73 Such an approach is 
problematic because, as Rosabeth M. Kanter’s classic study of tokenism 
and critical mass suggests, in the context of a male-dominated corporate 
environment, women have slim chance of being able to exert their influence 
until they constitute a significant minority group.74 Recent scholarship has 
reiterated concerns about tokenistic appointments. Campbell and Mínguez-
Vera explain that “a fresh perspective may not necessarily result in more 
effective monitoring if female board members are marginalised . . . .”75 
Once women have reached a critical mass, however, they can “begin to 
effect organizational changes.”76 
                                                            
72 Torchia et al., supra note 34. 
73 Stonington, supra note 7. 
74 Torchia et al., supra note 34 (citing KANTER, supra note 34). 
75 Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, supra note 13, at 440 (citing David Carter, Betty J. 
Simkins & W. Gary Simpson, Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value, 
38 FIN. REV. 33 (2003)).  
Carter et al. (2003) consider the link between board diversity and firm value in 
the context of agency theory, as outlined by Fama and Jensen (1983), and 
consider whether gender diversity enhances the board as a mechanism to 
control and monitor managers. They suggest that greater diversity may 
increase the independence of the board as women are more inclined to ask 
questions that would not be asked by male directors. However, they also point 
out that a fresh perspective may not necessarily result in more effective 
monitoring if female board members are marginalised and conclude that there 
is no a priori reason to expect greater gender diversity to enhance board 
monitoring. 
Id. 
76 Torchia et al., supra note 34 (citing KANTER, supra note 34). 
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Tokenistic appointments hinder the ability of token directors to contribute 
their talents and expertise to the board in a meaningful manner for a variety 
of reasons. Specifically, the negative consequences of tokenism include 
visibility, polarization, and assimilation.77 First, in terms of visibility, 
because the token individual finds herself being watched with high 
frequency, she perceives great pressure to perform.78 Second, polarization 
suggests that the token individual may experience extreme social isolation 
as members of the dominant group heighten their boundaries because they 
feel threatened.79 Finally, in terms of assimilation, the dominant group may 
force the token individual into a stereotypically defined minority group, 
with the unfortunate result of eliding any differences amongst members of 
such minority group.80 
In order to realize the arguably positive economic effects of gender 
diversity in the boardroom, and in light of the potentially negative 
consequences of tokenism, attaining a critical mass of women directors in 
the boardroom is of primary importance. A well-regarded study by Sumru 
Erkut, Vicki W. Kramer, and Alison M. Konrad explored the dimensions of 
numerical representation in the boardroom, comparing groups of one, two, 
and three women.81 The study found that three or more women directors are 
able to establish a critical mass, creating “normalization” where gender is 
no longer a barrier to communication, and where women directors are more 
likely to feel comfortable, supported, and freer to raise issues and actively 
                                                            




81 Terjesen et al., supra note 57, at 322–23 (citing Sumru Erkut, Vicki W. Kramer & 
Alison M. Konrad, Critical Mass: Does the Number of Women on a Corporate Board 
Make a Difference?, in WOMEN ON CORPORATE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: 
INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 350–66 (Susan Vinnicombe et al. eds., 
2008)). 
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participate.82 When such a critical mass is present, “diversity becomes not a 
‘woman’s issue,’ but a group responsibility.”83 
In a 2011 study, Mariateresa Torchia, Andrew Calabrò, and Morten Huse 
sampled approximately three hundred Norwegian firms in order to analyze 
gender diversity in the boardroom and its contribution to firm innovation.84 
Recognizing the variety of ways to measure the effects of gender diversity 
(e.g., male-to-female ratios, presence of women, and number of women), 
the study focused on the number of women directors and, drawing on 
critical mass theory, analyzed boards with one, two, or at least three 
women.85 The results suggest that “attaining critical mass – going from one 
or two women (a few tokens) to at least three women (consistent minority) 
– makes it possible to enhance the level of firm innovation.”86 Focusing 
specifically on firm “organizational innovation,” which refers to “the 
creation or adoption of an idea or behaviour that is new to the 
organization,”87 rather than on general measures of firm performance, the 
study found that “[o]nce the number of women directors increases from a 
few tokens (one woman, two women) to a consistent minority (‘at least 
three women’), they are able to effectively influence the level of 
organizational innovation.”88 
The results of this Norwegian-firm study are consistent with prior critical 
mass studies,89 and suggest that having at least three women directors brings 
                                                            
82 Id. (citing Erkut et al., supra note 81).  
83 Id. at 328. (citing Erkut et al., supra note 81). 
84 Torchia et al., supra note 34, at 300. 
85 Id. at 304. 
86 Id. at 300. 
87 Id. at 303 (citing Richard L. Daft, A Dual-Core Model of Organizational Innovation, 
21 ACAD. MGMT. J. 193 (1978); Fariborz Damanpour, Organizational Complexity and 
Innovation: Developing and Testing Multiple Contingency Models, 42 MGMT. SCI. 693 
(1996); Fariborz Damanpour, & William M. Evan, Organizational Innovation and 
Performance: The Problem of Organizational Lag, 29 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 392 (1984)). 
88 Id. at 311. 
89 Id. (citing Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 SCI. AM. 31 (1955); 
Rod Bond, Group Size and Conformity, 8 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 331 
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boards to a place of gender diversity in which genuine majority-minority 
interactions and processes occur, “thereby enabling the overall board to take 
high-quality decisions.”90 In contrast, because one or two women directors 
remain tokens, and because they are likely to conform to the majority’s 
viewpoints, they do not appear to influence the level of organizational 
innovation.91 
 In another recent study, three professors at HEC Montréal, a well-
regarded Canadian business school, sought to compare firm performance 
using a model that controlled for each firm’s associated risk level 
(something that most prior studies had failed to do).92 Risk level is 
particularly important in this line of research because women are “often 
appointed to leadership positions under problematic organizational 
circumstances”—a situation suggestive of a “glass cliff” in which women 
leaders are exposed to high risk of failure and criticism.93 Looking to female 
director and officer representation, the Canadian study indicates that when 
                                                                                                                              
(2005); Charlan J. Nemeth & Joel Wachtler, Creative Problem Solving as a Result of 
Majority and Minority Influence, 13 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 45 (1983); Sarah Tanford & 
Steven Penrod, Social Influence Model: A Formal Integration of Research on Majority 
and Minority Influence Processes, 95 PSYCHOL. BULL. 189 (1984)). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 308 (such findings are “in line with previous studies showing that if an 
individual is faced with the unanimous opinion of a group, that person is likely to 
conform to the unanimous ‘majority’ opinion”); see, e.g., Solomon E. Asch, Effects of 
Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgment, in GROUPS, 
LEADERSHIP AND MEN 177–90 (Harold S. Guetzkow ed., 1951); see also Solomon E. 
Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 SCI. AM. 31 (1955). 
92 Francoeur et al., supra note 54 (“[W]hereas previous works used either raw stock 
returns or accounting ratios, we apply the Fama and French . . . valuation framework, in 
order to take risk levels into account when comparing firm performances.”); see Eugene 
F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns, 47 J. FIN. 
427 (1992); see also Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the 
Returns on Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1993). 
93 Francoeur et al., supra note 54, at 84, 93 (citing Michelle K. Ryan & S. Alexander 
Haslam, What Lies Beyond the Glass Ceiling?, 14 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. INT’L DIG. 3 
(2006); Michelle K. Ryan & S. Alexander Haslam, The Glass Cliff: Evidence that Women 
Are Over-Represented in Precarious Leadership Positions, 16 BRIT. J. OF MGMT. 81 
(2005)). 
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firms operate in complex environments, such firms generate “positive and 
significant abnormal returns” when they have a high proportion of women 
in leadership roles.94 
Interestingly, because the Canadian study relied on data from 2001 to 
2004 in computing average female representation over a two-year period,95 
and because the average levels of female representation have increased, 
today, the same study might generate even more dramatic empirical results 
today. The Fortune 500 corporations that were deemed “high percentage 
firms” had a median of 15.4 percent women directors and 20.0 percent 
women officers.96 Today, amongst Fortune 500 corporations, an average of 
16.1 percent of directors are women.97 Drawing on Torchia et al.’s critical 
mass-oriented study,98 recent increases in levels of gender diversity in the 
boardroom suggest that corporations with a critical mass of female directors 
may be able to achieve returns substantially larger than those suggested by 
the Canadian study. 
C. Why the Lack of Gender Diversity? 
If gender diversity in the boardroom is indeed sound business policy, one 
has to wonder why there is so little of it. And, assuming diversity’s 
desirability, what should be done to encourage it? 
In general terms, both individual and organizational factors contribute to 
the lack of gender diversity on corporate boards.99 Research on individual 
factors, such as gender-related demographic characteristics, behavior 
patterns and types of interaction, and professional experience and 
                                                            
94 Id. at 83–84 (firms operating in complex environments experienced “returns of 0.17% 
monthly, intuitively amounting to a 6% return over a 3-year period”). 
95 Id. at 86–87. 
96 Id. at 88. 
97 STATISTICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 5 (citing POPULATION SURVEY, supra note 5). 
98 See Torchia et al., supra note 34. 
99 Villiers, supra note 52, at 537 (citing Amy J. Hillman, Christine Shropshire & Albert 
A. Cannella, Jr., Organizational Predictors of Women on Corporate Boards, 50 ACAD. 
MGMT. J. 941 (2007)). 
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connections “can yield insight into how specific women advance into the 
boardroom, but . . . cannot answer the question of why some firms have 
female directors and others do not.”100 Organizational characteristics, in 
contrast, can help in understanding the nature of the conditions in which a 
board is likely to have a higher level of gender diversity.101 
Organizational factors relate to the structures of workplace interactions 
and the nature of everyday decision-making.102 Reflecting on low levels of 
women in positions of power, many have suggested the existence of a 
“glass ceiling.” Professor Charlotte Villiers analyzed the low level of 
women directors in the United Kingdom: “the fact that half the workforce is 
comprised of women but only around 14% of directors in the largest 
companies are women indicates that a glass ceiling exists, preventing 
women from progressing to the top of their careers.”103 Professor Susan 
Sturm suggests, “the glass ceiling remains a barrier for women . . . largely 
because of patterns of interaction, informal norms, networking, training, 
mentoring, and evaluation, as well as the absence of systematic efforts to 
address bias produced by these patterns.”104 
                                                            
100 Hillman et al., supra note 99, at 941.  
Women are increasing in number among corporations’ boards of directors, yet 
their representation is far from uniform across firms. In this study, we adopted 
a resource dependence theory lens to identify organizational predictors of 
women on boards. We tested our hypotheses using panel data from the 1,000 
U.S. firms that were largest in terms of sales between 1990 and 2003. We 
found that organizational size, industry type, firm diversification strategy, and 
network effects (linkages to other boards with women directors) significantly 
impact the likelihood of female representation on boards of directors. 
Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Villiers, supra note 52, at 537 (citing Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment 
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 469 (2001)). 
103 Id. at 536–37. 
104 Id. at 537 (quoting Sturm, supra note 102). 
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Some contend that there are insufficient numbers of “board-ready” 
women who possess the requisite qualifications and experience.105 This may 
be partly due to the manner in which directors are recruited. Oftentimes, 
prior boardroom or senior management experience constitutes the main 
selection criteria.106 Furthermore, traditional recruitment practices are 
frequently informal and leverage personal networks, which means “many 
directors have been selected from relatively narrow pools of people sharing 
common experiences, career patterns and backgrounds.”107 Such 
recruitment practices perpetuate the homogeneity, continuing what some 
refer to as “white middle-class male dominance.”108 
By expanding traditional, narrow recruitment strategies, boards could 
facilitate increased gender diversity. A number of elite schools, including 
those that follow, have developed director databases comprised of highly 
qualified women interested in pursuing directorships: Kellogg School of 
Management, Northwestern University: Center for Executive Women;109 
University of North Carolina School of Law: Director Diversity 
Initiative;110 and Stanford Graduate School of Business: Stanford Women 
                                                            
105 Amanda Stevens & Alina Humphreys, Merit Demands Quotas: Statistics Suggest It 
Makes Good Business Sense To Have Legislated Quotas for Women on Company Boards, 
85 LAW INST. J. 83 (2011) (advocating for the implementation of quotas in Australia, 
both because companies with female directors perform better and because the severe 
underutilization of female human capital is inefficient and inequitable). 
106 LAURA TYSON, THE TYSON REPORT ON THE RECRUITMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS: A REPORT COMMISSIONED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF 
TRADE & INDUSTRY FOLLOWING THE PUBLICATION OF THE HIGGS REVIEW OF THE 
ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS IN JANUARY 2003 5 (2003), 
available at http://www.london.edu/facultyandresearch/research/docs/TysonReport.pdf. 
107 Id. at 6. 
108 Villiers, supra note 52, at 539 (citing TYSON, supra note 106). 
109 Database of Women Directors, KELLOGG SCH. MGMT.: CENTER FOR EXECUTIVE 
WOMEN, http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/cew/resources.htm (last visited 
Aug. 6, 2012). 
110 The Director Diversity Initiative, U. N. C. SCH. L., https://ddi.law.unc.edu/default.aspx 
(last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
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on Boards Initiative.111 The Stanford initiative’s homepage states, “The 
demand for women to serve on corporate boards has never been greater, yet 
those responsible for recruiting new corporate directors claim there aren’t 
enough qualified women to fill the spots.”112 The schools that sponsor these 
initiatives hope to facilitate increased boardroom diversity by matching 
qualified candidates with corporations in search of potential directors.113 
Finally, the lack of gender diversity in the boardroom may stem largely 
from the fact that directors do not generally find existing board composition 
to be problematic.114 In fact, some have argued in favor of homogenous 
groups, citing their ability to efficiently reach decisions.115 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP’s (PwC) 2010 survey of corporate directors 
revealed that, when asked about the nominating or governance committee’s 
“ability to create a board with a balance of needed skills and diversity,” 
nearly three-quarters of directors responded that such committees were 
“effective” or “very effective.”116 Only 5 percent of directors gave negative 
ratings to committees’ effectiveness on these matters.117 The remaining 20 
percent of directors surveyed were neutral on the matter.118 Nevertheless, 
less than one-fifth of Fortune 500 companies have 25 percent or more 
                                                            
111 Corporate Boards: Stanford Women on Boards Initiative, STANFORD GRADUATE SCH. 
BUS., http://alumni.gsb.stanford.edu/women/corpboards/index.html (last visited Aug. 6, 
2012). 
112 Id. 
113 See, e.g., Database of Women Directors, supra note 109; see also The Director 
Diversity Initiative, supra note 110; Corporate Boards: Stanford Women on Boards 
Initiative, supra note 111. 
114 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, ANNUAL CORPORATE DIRECTORS SURVEY: THE 
2010 RESULTS 15 (2010), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/corporate-
governance/assets/annual-corporate-directors-survey-2010.pdf. 
115 See, e.g., John A. Wagner III, J.L. Stimpert & Edward I. Fubara, Board Composition 
and Organizational Performance: Two Studies of Insider/Outsider Effects, 35 J. MGMT. 
STUD. 655, 667 (1998) (finding that greater board homogeneity was positively correlated 
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women directors.119 One clear implication of this data is that a majority of 
existing directors simply do not view the need for increased gender 
diversity in the boardroom as imperative. 
II. BOARDROOM DIVERSITY: CONSTRUCTING AN EFFECTIVE 
REGULATORY RESPONSE 
Transatlantic dialogue is a longstanding phenomenon, and one that has 
become increasingly pertinent within the realm of financial regulation.120 In 
2002, for example, the SEC and the European Commission launched the 
US-EU Financial Markets Dialogue, which aims “to enhance understanding 
of each other’s system of regulation, and explore areas of regulatory 
cooperation and convergence in the development of high-quality 
regulation.”121 Reflecting on the range of international responses to 
boardroom gender diversity can facilitate the United States’ ability to 
effectively develop its own approach. 
In 2005, Norway became the first country to mandate gender diversity on 
corporate boards.122 Other nations have since followed suit, introducing a 
range of regulatory and legislative initiatives aimed at achieving greater 
gender diversity in the boardroom. While governmental involvement has 
been quite limited in the United States, the SEC took an initial regulatory 
                                                            
119 RACHEL SOARES, ET AL., CATALYST CENSUS: FORTUNE 500 WOMEN BOARD 
DIRECTORS 1 (2011), available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/533/2011_fortune_500_ 
census_wbd.pdf. 
120 “The global economic significance of capital markets and their intensifying 
interdependence have led U.S. and EU policymakers to recognise the need for structured 
dialogue and cooperation with a view to ensuring efficient and credible solutions that 
guarantee effective investor protection and a high level of business efficiency.” KERN 
ALEXANDER, ET AL., A REPORT ON THE TRANSATLANTIC FINANCIAL SERVICES 
REGULATORY DIALOGUE 5 (2007). 
121 SEC Participation in Bilateral Dialogues with Foreign Regulatory Authorities, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/ 
oia_bilateraldialogs.shtml#us-eu (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
122 DELOITTE GLOBAL, supra note 12, at 14. 
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step into the realm of boardroom diversity by introducing enhanced 
disclosure requirements in 2009.123 
A. Examples from Abroad 
1. Hard Regulations 
With Norway leading the way, a number of other European countries 
(including France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain) have followed suit, 
legislating various quota requirements—some mandatory, some requiring 
companies to “comply or explain”—in order to achieve gender diversity in 
the boardroom.124 
a) Norway—Quotas 
Ansgar Gabrielsen, the conservative trade minister who drafted the 
Norwegian gender diversity legislation, was motivated by the “business 
case” to institute mandatory quotas.125 Described as “an archetypal alpha-
male businessman,”126 Gabrielsen explained his support of the quota 
requirement: “To me, the law was not about getting equality between the 
sexes, it was about the fact that diversity is a value in itself, that it creates 
wealth.”127 After more than two decades of women and men attending 
university in equal numbers, and with so many professionally experienced 
women, Gabrielsen did not think that the dearth of women directors made 
sense; in fact, such qualified women represented a valuable, underutilized 
resource in terms of human capital.128 
                                                            
123 Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(1–2) (2012). 
124 See id. 
125 DELOITTE GLOBAL, supra note 12, at 14. 
126 Id. 
127 Gwladys Fouché, A Woman’s Place Is . . . On the Board, GUARDIAN, Aug. 10, 2005, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2005/aug/10/workandcareers.genderissues. 
128 Id. 
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While the Norwegian law is commonly thought to require that the boards 
of publicly held corporations be comprised of at least 40 percent women,129 
the legislation is actually crafted in gender-neutral language and is 
substantially more nuanced than reference to a “40 percent rule” suggests. 
The overarching theme is that each gender shall have significant 
representation in the boardroom. This goal dovetails nicely with critical 
mass theory and helps to ensure that women directors are able to bring their 
added value to the boardroom rather than fall victim to tokenism. 
In 2005, the Norwegian Public Limited Liabilities Companies Act was 
amended to state the following: 
 If the board of directors has two or three members, both 
sexes shall be represented; 
 If the board of directors has four or five members, each 
sex shall be represented by at least two directors; 
 If the board of directors has six to eight members, each 
sex shall be represented by at least three directors; 
 If the board of directors has nine members, each sex 
shall be represented by at least four directors; 
 If the board of directors has more than nine members, 
each sex shall be represented by at least 40 percent 
directors.130 
Public companies had until January 1, 2008, to meet the requirements, 
with noncompliance resulting in dissolution.131 While no company has yet 
been dissolved for such noncompliance, some companies have opted to 
delist and go private.132 Of the approximately five hundred companies 
                                                            
129 See, e.g., Terjesen et al., supra note 57, at 321 (“[T]he Norwegian government 
requires that boards of directors of publicly held firms be comprised of at least 40 per 
cent women . . . .”). 
130 DELOITTE GLOBAL, supra note 12, at 14 (“Disclosure of the state of diversity within 
the company is also required under the Norwegian Accounting Act.”). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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affected by the law, about one hundred companies opted to delist; however, 
according to Norwegian business leaders, the choice to delist was mainly a 
result of other legislative requirements that became effective during a 
similar time period, rather than a direct result of the quota requirement.133 
b) France—Quotas Plus “Comply or Explain” 
In 2008, the French amended their constitution in order to permit the use 
of quotas with respect to gender diversity on corporate boards.134 In January 
2011, the Assemblée Nationale and Sénat agreed upon legislation aimed at 
increasing female representation on boards. Similar to the Norwegian law, 
the French law requires at least 40 percent representation of each gender on 
boards.135 As of May 2012, the law had not yet been enacted in the Journal 
Officiel.136 The French law is actually more expansive than the Norwegian 
law in that it targets not only public companies, but also non-listed 
companies that have revenues or total assets over 50 million Euros or that 
have employed five hundred or more persons for three consecutive years.137 
Anticipating such legislation, in 2010, AFEP-MEDEF (the French 
Private Companies Association and French Business Confederation) 
amended its corporate governance code to reflect the 40 percent 
requirement.138 While compliance with AFEP-MEDEF’s code is not 
mandatory, if a company fails to comply, it must explain such 
noncompliance in its annual report.139 
                                                            
133 Claire Braund, Looking at the Big Picture on Gender Diversity, WOMENONBOARDS: 
THE NEXT GENERATION OF DIRECTORS, http://www.womenonboards.org.au/pubs/ 
articles/norway_bigpicture.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2012) (the Norwegian business 
leaders expressing this view were those in attendance at the October 2010 Boardroom 
Impact Conference in Oslo, Norway). 
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2. Soft Regulations 
Other countries (including Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom) 
have opted for a “soft” regulatory approach, instituting primarily disclosure-
oriented gender diversity regulations and requiring companies to “comply 
or explain.”140 
a) Australia 
In June 2010, the Australian government reissued its corporate 
governance code.141 It now contains recommendations related to gender 
diversity.142 Public companies (defined as those listed on the Australian 
Securities Exchange) are required to do the following: 
 Adopt and publicly disclose a diversity policy; 
 Establish measurable objectives for achieving gender 
diversity and assess annually both the objectives and 
progress towards achieving them; 
 Disclose in each annual report the measurable 
objectives for achieving gender diversity and progress 
towards achieving them; 
 Disclose in each annual report the proportion of women 
employees in the whole organisation, in senior 
executive positions, on the board; 
 Disclose the mix of skills and diversity for which the 
board is looking to achieve in membership of the 
board.143 
                                                            
140 See id. at 6, 18, 23. Professor Marc T. Moore’s discussion of the “soft” and “comply 
or explain” regulatory approaches aids in contextualizing the use of such approaches 
today. Marc T. Moore, The End of “Comply or Explain” in UK Corporate Governance?, 
60 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 85 (2009). 
141 DELOITTE GLOBAL, supra note 12, at 6. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
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While compliance with the new recommendations is not mandatory, 
companies who choose not to comply must explain their noncompliance in 
each annual report.144 
b) The United Kingdom 
In 2010, the FRC reissued the UK Corporate Governance Code.145 It 
included a new provision requiring that “[t]he search for board candidates 
should be conducted, and appointments made, on merit, against objective 
criteria and with due regard for the benefits of diversity on the board, 
including gender.”146 Companies must either comply with the provisions or 
provide an explanation for their noncompliance.147 
The FRC’s interest in increased gender diversity originates in concerns 
about “board effectiveness” when gender diversity is low or nonexistent. 
Low levels of gender diversity not only contribute to the FRC’s wariness of 
“group think,” but also cause the FRC to be concerned that companies’ 
behavior is inefficient with respect to (1) utilization of the available talent 
pool, (2) comprehension of customers and employees, and (3) 
encouragement of female employees seeking professional advancement.148 
Nonetheless, the FRC is opposed to setting minimum gender diversity 
targets as part of the UK Corporate Governance Code: “No matter how it 
[is] qualified, embedding a specific figure would inevitably by viewed as a 
quota.”149 Nor does the FRC believe that companies ought to focus solely 
on gender diversity to the exclusion of other diversity considerations.150 In 
                                                            
144 Id. (Australia’s Corporate Governance is known as the “ASX Corporate Governance 
Council Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations”). 
145 Id. at 16. 
146 Id.  
147 Id. Furthermore, while the Equality Act 2010 “gives the government power to make 
regulations requiring disclosure of the gender pay gap,” the government’s present tactic is 
to work with companies towards increased voluntary disclosure of compensation rather 
than to enforce mandatory disclosure. Id. 
148 FEEDBACK STATEMENT, supra note 25, at 4. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
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this respect, the FRC seeks to pursue an arguably holistic conception of 
“diversity.” 
In May 2011, the FRC issued a consultation document considering two 
proposed amendments to the revised UK Corporate Governance Code 
(which had gone into effect June 2010).151 After reviewing the public’s 
responses, the FRC stated its intention to implement both amendments, 
effective October 2012.152 The provision covering board appointments will 
require that “a separate section of the annual report . . . include a description 
of the board’s policy on diversity, including gender, any measurable 
objectives that it has set for implementing the policy, and progress on 
achieving the objectives.”153 The section entitled “Evaluation” will specify 
“[board] diversity, including gender,” as one of the factors for consideration 
as part of the evaluation of board effectiveness.154 
B. The United States 
1. The SEC’s Diversity Disclosure Requirement 
In 2009, the SEC enacted a diversity disclosure requirement.155 The text 
of the requirement reads as follows: 
Describe the nominating committee’s process for identifying and 
evaluating nominees for director, including nominees 
recommended by security holders, and any differences in the 
manner in which the nominating committee evaluates nominees for 
director based on whether the nominee is recommended by a 
security holder, and whether, and if so how, the nominating 
committee (or the board) considers diversity in identifying 
nominees for director. If the nominating committee (or the board) 
has a policy with regard to the consideration of diversity in 
identifying director nominees, describe how this policy is 
                                                            
151 Id. at 1. 
152 Id. at 2. 
153 Id. at 5. 
154 Id. at 6. 
155 Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(1–2) (2012). 
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implemented, as well as how the nominating committee (or the 
board) assesses the effectiveness of its policy . . . .156 
The new rule, which went into effect on February 28, 2010, is designed 
“to assess a company’s commitment to developing and maintaining a 
diverse board.”157 Public companies are required to disclose the following 
in their proxy statements: “whether diversity is a factor in considering 
candidates for nomination to the board of directors; how diversity is 
considered in that process, and; [sic] how the company assesses the 
effectiveness of its policy for considering diversity [if the company has such 
a policy].”158 The SEC, however, purposefully opted to leave the term 
“diversity” undefined;159 hence, “companies may develop and disclose their 
own standards and address matters such as diverse business experience.”160 
The SEC’s adoptive release explicates the rationale for adopting the 
diversity disclosure requirement.161 Such rationale rests largely on the 
“business case” for board diversity.162 In adopting the amendment, the SEC 
                                                            
156 Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2011) (emphasis added). 
157 Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The SEC and Corporate 
Governance—An Overview in the Wake of Dodd-Frank, Speech at the New America 
Alliance Latino Economic Forum (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/2010/spch111810laa.htm. 
158 Id. 
159 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,344 (Dec. 23, 2009). 
We recognize that companies may define diversity in various ways, reflecting 
different perspectives. For instance, some companies may conceptualize 
diversity expansively to include differences of viewpoint, professional 
experience, education, skill and other individual qualities and attributes that 
contribute to board heterogeneity, while others may focus on diversity 
concepts such as race, gender and national origin. We believe that for purposes 
of this disclosure requirement, companies should be allowed to define diversity 
in ways that they consider appropriate. As a result we have not defined 
diversity in the amendments. 
Id. 
160 Practising Law Institute, Selected Recent Developments in U.S. Securities Laws and 
Corporate Finance, as of August 25, 2010, 1849 PLI/Corp 453, 513 (2010). 
161 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343–44 (Dec. 23, 2009). 
162 See Fairfax, supra note 53, at 872–73. 
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voiced its agreement with members of the public who had commented in 
favor of the proposed amendment requiring additional disclosure of board 
diversity: “We agree that it is useful for investors to understand how the 
board considers and addresses diversity, as well as the board’s assessment 
of the implementation of its diversity policy, if any.”163 
Commenters had noted that board diversity information was important to 
investors,164 and that it would enable investors to make better-informed 
decisions with respect to voting and investing.165 They had also noted “a 
meaningful relationship between diverse boards and improved corporate 
financial performance,” as well as the fact that such diverse boards can 
more effectively recruit and retain employees.166 The financial performance 
comment is particularly demonstrative of the influence of the business 
rationale on the SEC’s decision to adopt the diversity disclosure 
requirement.167 Professor Lisa Fairfax emphasizes that “enhance[d] board 
quality and decision making[] [are] two key components of the business 
rationale.”168 Additionally, she notes that in recognizing that the disclosure 
requirements may encourage boards to conduct more extensive director 
searches and to consider a wider range of criteria in their selection 
                                                            
163 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343 (Dec. 23, 2009). 
164 Id. at 68,343 n.116 (citing letters from Board of Directors Network, Boston Common 
Asset Management, CalPERS, CalSTRS, Calvert, Council of Urban Professionals, Ernst 
& Young LLP (E&Y), Greenlining Institute, Hispanic Association on Corporate 
Responsibility, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, InterOrganization 
Network, Latino Business Chamber of Greater Los Angeles, Pax World Management 
Corporation, Prout Group, Inc., RiskMetrics, Sisters of Charity BVM, Sisters of St. 
Joseph Carondelet, and Trillium Asset Management Corporation). 
165 Id. at 68,343. 
166 Id.; see, e.g., Comment Letter from Ilene H. Lang, President and CEO, Catalyst, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-100.pdf; see also Comment Letter from 
Lisa N. Woll, CEO, Social Investment Forum, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/ 
s71309-55.pdf. 
167 Fairfax, supra note 53, at 872–73. 
168 Id. at 872. 
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process,169 “the SEC acknowledged that the rule could prompt more 
corporations to embrace diversity procedures.”170 
2. Reactions to the Requirement: Shortcomings? 
Less than one year after the rule went into effect, SEC Commissioner 
Luis Aguilar reflected on the kind of information that companies had 
chosen to provide pursuant to the diversity disclosure requirement.171 He 
expressed dissatisfaction with the substantial number of companies that had 
provided only abstract disclosure, such as a statement indicating that 
“diversity was something considered as part of an informal policy,” rather 
than a “discussion of any concrete steps taken to give real meaning to its 
efforts to create a diverse board.”172 He further noted that, “[b]y leaving out 
the steps taken and how those efforts are evaluated, these companies . . . 
deprive[] investors of information they have demanded.”173 
The SEC’s failure to define diversity has been an important aspect of the 
developing debate. In some ways, leaving “diversity” as an ambiguous term 
is a politically acceptable approach—perhaps even an advantageous one—
as it focuses attention on the business advantages of increased diversity 
while indirectly addressing the issue of gender equality.174 At the same 
time, however, because there are different types of diversity and because 
each company may define “diversity” as it chooses, the current regulation 
leaves ample room for corporations to avoid addressing boardroom 
diversity in a meaningful fashion. Furthermore, given that there is no 
explicit requirement that companies address gender diversity in particular, 
                                                            
169 See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,355 (Dec. 23, 2009). 
170 Fairfax, supra note 53, at 872–73. 
171 Aguilar, supra note 157. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 But see Villiers, supra note 52, at 556–57 (arguing that it is problematic to view 
diversity “as the solution to the continuing problem of discrimination” because “diversity 
itself does not necessarily eradicate discrimination”—in other words, acceptance of 
diversity does not alone signal the obsolesce of discriminatory stances). 
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even those companies that do value a diverse board may choose to focus on 
other types of diversity, thereby neglecting gender diversity altogether. 
In its annual survey of corporate directors, PwC focused a number of 
questions on the SEC’s new disclosure requirements, as well as on the 
importance of gender diversity in the boardroom in general.175 Overall, 
directors believed that the disclosure rules were of little value to investors in 
terms of defining “board diversity.”176 On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being 
“extremely valuable” and 5 being “not at all valuable,” the mean response 
was 3.6.177 In a comment letter to the SEC, Professors Lissa Broome and 
Thomas Hazen wrote that the SEC should “require disclosure of how 
diversity is defined by the nominating committee.”178 They suggested that 
requiring such a definition would better address the concerns and interests 
of many shareholders, including large institutional investors, who have been 
“actively urging corporate boards to consider constructing a diverse board 
when making directors nominations.”179 Furthermore, Professors Broom 
and Hazen argued that the SEC ought to “require director nominees and 
continuing directors to self-report their gender, and race and ethnicity under 
the EEO [Equal Employment Opportunity] categories,” noting that many 
organizations focused on developing boardroom diversity “spend countless 
hours trying to divine this information (with or without the cooperation of 
the companies) so that board . . . diversity may be measured.”180 
                                                            
175 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, supra note 114. Using a service provider, 10,000 
directors from the top 2,000 companies (according to revenue) were randomly selected to 
receive the questionnaire; 1,110 directors completed the survey. Id. at 35. 
176 Id. at 2. 
177 Id.  
178 Comment Letter from Lissa Lamkin Broome & Thomas Lee Hazen, Professors of 
Law, Univ. of N.C., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Sept. 
15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-09/s71309-65.pdf 
(addressing whether we should “amend Item 407(c)(2)(V) to require disclosure of any 
additional factors that a nominating committee considers when selecting someone for a 
position on the board, such as diversity”). 
179 Id. at 2. 
180 Id. 
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There is at least some evidence to suggest that corporations have not 
taken a serious view of the diversity disclosure requirement. PwC’s survey 
revealed that a vast majority of directors—more than three-quarters of those 
surveyed—responded “no” when asked whether “the discussion about the 
new proxy disclosure rule on director and nominee experience, 
qualifications, attributes or skills cause [their] board[s] to re-think the mix 
of directors currently on the board.”181 This suggests that a more robust 
disclosure requirement may be needed to encourage corporate boards to 
employ procedures that could increase boardroom diversity. 
Furthermore, from 2010 to 2011 there was little change in directors’ 
perceptions of the difficulty involved in achieving gender diversity: slightly 
over half of directors believed that it was either somewhat difficult or very 
difficult; about one-third of directors thought that it was not at all difficult; 
and around 15 percent stated that gender diversity was simply not an 
attribute for which they were looking.182 For those directors who believe 
that achieving gender diversity is a difficult task, leveraging the assistance 
of some of the numerous organizations encouraging boardroom diversity 
would be helpful. A short list of such organizations includes Catalyst, ION, 
Forum for Women Entrepreneurs & Executives, Director Diversity 
Initiative, and the Alliance for Board Diversity,183 as well as the director 
databases developed by a number of elite schools.184  
                                                            
181 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, supra note 114, at 5. 
182 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, ANNUAL CORPORATE DIRECTORS SURVEY 
2011 FINDINGS: BOARDS RESPOND TO STAKEHOLDER CONCERNS 18 (2011), available at 
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/corporate-governance/assets/annual-corporate-director-
survey-2011.pdf; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, supra note 114, at 24.  
183 Comment Letter from Broome & Hazen, supra note 178, at 2. 
184 See, e.g., Database of Women Directors, supra note 109; The Director Diversity 
Initiative, supra note 110; Corporate Boards: Stanford Women on Boards Initiative, 
supra note 111. 
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III. THE DESIRABILITY OF A MORE ROBUST REGULATION 
In light of the business advantages of increased gender diversity in the 
boardroom and the apparent shortcomings of the SEC’s enhanced proxy 
disclosure requirements, more robust requirements targeting gender 
diversity appear desirable. 
A. An Enhanced Regulation to Foster Meaningful Gender Diversity 
Given that a critical mass of women directors is essential to reaping the 
benefits of boardroom diversity, there is strong incentive for the SEC to 
enact a more robust diversity disclosure requirement. Commissioner 
Aguilar’s expressed disappointment in the type of disclosure provided by 
corporations, and the fact that such minimal disclosure fails to provide 
investors with relevant information,185 highlights the fact that the existing 
requirements may not be sufficient to foster the desired “meaningful 
relationship between diverse boards and improved corporate financial 
performance.”186 
In the last ten years, two important pieces of federal legislation have 
brought increased aspects of internal corporate governance under the SEC’s 
purview.187 In 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) introduced the requirement of a 
board of independent directors on the audit committee, while, in 2010, 
Dodd-Frank added a requirement that boards have a compensation 
committee and that such committee be composed of independent 
directors.188 Much of policymakers’ motivation for such requirements was 
                                                            
185 See Aguilar, supra note 157. 
186 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343–44 (Dec. 23, 2009); 
see, e.g., Comment Letter from Lang, supra note 159; Comment Letter from Woll, supra 
note 159. 
186 Fairfax, supra note 53, at 872–73. 
187 CHARLES R. T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 218 (6th ed. Supp. 2011–2012). 
188 Id. (Additionally, stock exchanges require that boards “have an overall majority of 
independent directors and that the nominating/governance committee, as well as the audit 
and compensation committee . . . be made up of independent directors.”). 
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their belief that “independence on corporate boards is important to good 
corporate governance.”189 Professor Hazen has suggested, hypothetically, 
that if the business case for increased gender diversity was empirically 
strong enough, there might be an argument that the SEC “should require 
diversity on boards, just as publicly held corporations must have a 
significant number of independent directors.”190 This is not yet the reality. 
Furthermore, European-style quotas tend to run counter to American 
antidiscrimination laws191 and the prevalent American viewpoint that the 
“operational flexibility and dynamism” associated with lower levels of 
market regulation are beneficial in economic terms.192 It is, therefore, 
unlikely that the time has arrived when quota requirements would be able to 
garner widespread support. 
Nonetheless, there are numerous ways in which the existing requirement 
could be strengthened to encourage genuine gender diversity. First, the SEC 
ought to define “diversity,” and in that definition specifically include gender 
diversity. Second, the SEC ought to require corporations to have a diversity 
policy and to disclose that policy. Third, the SEC ought to consider 
                                                            
189 Hazen, supra note 20, at 893. 
190 Id. at 892–93. 
191 See, e.g., id. at 893 (“In addition, a social justice rationale for board diversity may 
encourage corporations to increase diversity, but it is not so strong as to have convinced 
policy makers to apply the antidiscrimination laws to corporate boards.”). 
192 Moore, supra note 140, at 85.  
[T]he history of corporate and financial regulation in the UK can best be 
depicted as an ongoing contest between: on the one hand, institutional 
investors and boards favouring the preservation of operational flexibility and 
dynamism; and, on the other, a democratic state striving to ensure the public 
accountability of a sector whose activities have profound (albeit seldom 
understood) implications for the country’s “real” economy and society. 
Id. While Professor Moore’s discussion centers on the history of corporate and financial 
regulation in the UK, he notes that a similar analysis is applicable with respect to the 
development of systems of corporate and financial regulation in the United States, and 
refers readers to David Skeel’s book. Id.; see DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE 
BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY 
CAME FROM (2005). 
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introducing a nonbinding “say-on-diversity” requirement similar to Dodd-
Frank’s “say-on-pay” requirement. 
1. The SEC Should Define “Diversity” to Include “Gender Diversity” 
As previously discussed, the failure to define “diversity” robs investors of 
the meaningful information that they desire.193 Moreover, leaving the term 
undefined also implies a failure to hold corporate boards accountable for 
their efforts to further diversity in the boardroom. From Professor Hazen’s 
point of view, the SEC’s failure to define diversity is “potentially 
devastating” to the disclosure requirement.194 He says that such failure 
“could limit significantly the ability of the SEC’s new rule to alter the status 
quo with respect to racial and gender diversity on boards.”195 
Specifically, the SEC regulation undoubtedly needs to articulate “gender” 
within the definition of “diversity.” Recent developments in the United 
Kingdom suggest the desirability of explicitly defining gender diversity as 
part of board diversity. With respect to both evaluation of board 
effectiveness and description of diversity policies, the FRC has amended the 
revised UK Corporate Governance Code to employ the phrase, “diversity, 
including gender.”196 While there was some debate over whether to narrow 
                                                            
193 Hazen, supra note 20, at 896 (citing Comment Letter from Broome & Hazen, supra 
note 178). 
194 Fairfax, supra note 53, at 874–75. 
195 Id. 
196 FEEDBACK STATEMENT, supra note 25, at 5–6. The revised provision B.2.4 will read: 
A separate section of the annual report should describe the work of the 
nomination committee, including the process it has used in relation to board 
appointments. This section should include a description of the board’s policy 
on diversity, including gender, any measurable objectives that it has set for 
implementing the policy, and progress on achieving the objectives. An 
explanation should be given if neither an external search consultancy nor open 
advertising has been used in the appointment of a chairman or a non-executive 
director. 
Id. The new supporting principle B.6 will read: “Evaluation of the board should consider 
the balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge of the company on the 
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or broaden this definition of “diversity,” the FRC ultimately decided that 
while “companies should not focus purely on gender at the expense of other 
aspects of diversity[,] . . . adding specific reference to other aspects of 
diversity could result in the Code provision becoming a long, unhelpful, list 
of such attributes.”197 The wording of the current SEC disclosure 
requirement could easily be amended in a similar fashion, replacing 
“diversity” with “diversity, including gender.”  
2. The SEC Should Require a Diversity Policy and Disclosure of Such 
Policy 
Companies are not currently required to have a diversity policy in 
place.198 Professor Fairfax points out that “the lack of such a requirement 
undermines the rule’s ability to influence adoption of diversity policies.”199 
The rule requires policy-related disclosure only if a board has chosen (of its 
own volition) to institute a diversity policy; in such cases, the board must 
describe how the policy is implemented and how the board assesses its 
effectiveness.200 Somewhat surprisingly, there is no requirement that the 
board disclose the policy itself.201 The board is only required to disclose 
“whether, and if so how, the nominating committee (or the board) considers 
diversity in identifying nominees for directors.”202 
The existing policy-related disclosure requirement may actually 
discourage, rather than encourage, corporations from developing a policy. 
Somewhat perversely, if a corporation does not have a written policy, it 
                                                                                                                              
board, its diversity, including gender, how the board works together as a unit, and other 
factors relevant to its effectiveness.” Id. 
197 Id. at 4. 
198 Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(1–2) (2012). 
199 Fairfax, supra note 52, at 875. (Professor Fairfax, nonetheless, acknowledges that “it 
may be inappropriate for the SEC to require corporations to consider diversity in their 
board structure.”). 
200  Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(1–2) (2012). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
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need not make any disclosures. If it does have a policy, however, it must go 
to the trouble of explaining the policy, and expose itself to criticism about 
the implementation or effectiveness of the policy. In contrast, the UK 
Corporate Governance Code requires companies to have a diversity policy 
in place.203 The SEC’s requirement would be more effective if it were 
amended to require companies to have a diversity policy and to disclose it. 
Finally, given that corporations would be required to have diversity 
policies, there is uncertainty regarding the substantive content of such 
policies. There is an argument to be made for the SEC setting out some key 
elements for inclusion in corporations’ diversity policies—such oversight 
might help ensure effectiveness. Nonetheless, there is also a real danger that 
setting requirements or targets would unduly infringe upon a board’s ability 
to effectively direct and manage corporate operations, a domain that has 
traditionally been left to state law. In the United Kingdom, the FRC 
declined to set measurable objectives (i.e., a series of targets) for either to 
overall diversity or gender diversity per se.204 In its feedback statement, the 
FRC specified that, instead, “boards should report on what steps they are 
taking to achieve the diversity necessary to maximise the effectiveness of 
the board, and as part of that what consideration they have given to gender 
balance.”205 
3. The SEC Should Consider Introducing a Nonbinding “Say-on-
Diversity” Shareholder Vote 
Perhaps a preferable way to hold boards accountable for the substance of 
their diversity policies would be to implement a nonbinding “say-on-
diversity” vote, similar to Dodd-Frank’s nonbinding shareholder “say-on-
                                                            
203 FEEDBACK STATEMENT, supra note 25, at 5–6. 
204 Id. at 4. 
205 Id. (The UK Corporate Governance Code does, however, employ a “comply or 
explain” approach with regard to whether the board used either an external search 
consultancy or open advertising in appointing a chairman or non-executive director.). 
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pay” vote.206 Dodd-Frank requires enhanced disclosure with respect to 
executive compensation.207 Section 14A of the Securities Exchange Act 
(SEA) now mandates that boards elicit a nonbinding shareholder vote on 
executive compensation at least once every three years.208 While these votes 
are advisory only, “companies typically adjust their pay practices after 
defeat or in response to pressure from institutional shareholders and proxy 
advising firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services.”209 
Reflecting on the first year of mandatory say-on-pay, experts concur that 
both shareholders and corporations take these advisory votes seriously.210 
According to Patrick Quick, a partner at Foley & Lardner LLP, say-on-pay 
votes are “real votes that shareholders take very seriously, and 
[shareholders] will look closely at how public companies respond to what is 
communicated in the say-on-pay votes.”211 A recent study conducted by 
The Conference Board, NASDAQ, and the Rock Center for Corporate 
Governance at Stanford University clearly demonstrates that “companies do 
respond to the SOP [say-on-pay] policies adopted by proxy advisory    
firms. . . . All areas of the compensation program are affected, including 
disclosure, guidelines, and plan structure and design—although the degree 
to which these areas are affected varies considerably.”212 
                                                            
206 See generally Practising Law Institute, supra note 160. 
207 O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 187, at 218. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. (citing Joann S. Lublin, Pay Starts to Bend to Advisory Votes, WALL ST. J., July 
29, 2011, at C3).  
210 See, e.g., Talking Points: Say-on-Pay Best Practices in 2012, BOARDMEMBER.COM 
(Jan. 17, 2012), https://www.boardmember.com/Article_Details.aspx?id=7227; see also 
Elizabeth Pfeuti, Say-on-Pay Votes Are ‘Working’, AICIO (Mar. 29, 2012, 7:32 AM), 
http://www.ai-cio.com/channel/NEWSMAKERS/Say-on-
Pay_Votes_Are_’Working’.html; Charles Nathan, James D.C. Barrall & Alice Chung, 
Say on Pay 2011: Proxy Advisors on Course for Hegemony, N.Y. L. J., Nov. 28, 2011, 
available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub4467_1.pdf. 
211 Talking Points, supra note 210, at 1. 
212 DAVID F. LARCKER, ALLAN L. MCCALL & BRIAN TAYAN, THE INFLUENCE OF PROXY 
ADVISORY FIRM VOTING RECOMMENDATIONS ON SAY-ON-PAY VOTES AND EXECUTIVE 
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With regard to best practices, Quick suggests that corporations ought to 
include a description of their pay for performance policy.213 This is 
particularly important considering that, while the large majority of say-on-
pay votes were positive, at least nine lawsuits have been filed that “alleg[e] 
breach of fiduciary duty in cases where a board of directors approved an 
executive compensation package that was rejected by the shareholders in an 
advisory vote.”214 Of these lawsuits, one US district court has upheld a 
claim grounded in a negative say-on-pay vote at the pleading stages.215 The 
failure to clearly describe their compensation schemes left companies 
vulnerable to allegations that they inaccurately deemed their compensation 
schemes as pay for performance.216 Even if much, or all, of the say-on-pay 
litigation is ultimately unsuccessful, the mere prospect of litigation, and the 
concomitant potential for shareholder alienation, encourages companies to 
                                                                                                                              
COMPENSATION DECISIONS 6 (2012), available at https://www.conference-
board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB-DN-V4N5-12.pdf&type=subsite. 
213 Talking Points, supra note 210, at 2. 
214 Michael J. McNamara, Occupying the Boardroom: Increasing Government Regulation 
and Growing Public Anger, in EMPLOYMENT LAW: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY 
STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR 2–4 (Aspatore rev. ed. 2012). “While Dodd-
Frank explicitly provides that ‘say on pay’ votes are non-binding and do not create or 
imply any change or addition to the fiduciary duties of an issuer or its board of directors, 
companies that underestimate the importance of such votes do so at their own peril.” Id. 
at 2. 
215 Id. at 3.  
In NECA-IBEW Pension Fund v. Cox, et al., No. 11-CV-0451, 2011 WL 
4383368 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2011), a federal judge in Ohio denied a motion 
to dismiss a ‘say on pay’ complaint alleging breach of fiduciary duty. . . . The 
Court found that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that he directors of the 
company approved the pay plan in violation of the company’s pay for 
performance policy, that the pay plan was not in the best interests of the 
shareholders, and therefore constituted an abuse of discretion sufficient at he 
pleading stage to overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule. 
The specific evidence the Court pointed to as support for the claim that the 
compensation policy was not in the best interests of the shareholders was the 
negative advisory vote. 
Id.  
216 Talking Points, supra note 210, at 2. 
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take measures to secure favorable shareholder votes on executive 
compensation packages.217 
The apparent efficacy of say-on-pay votes in influencing corporate 
executive compensation policies provides strong support for the proposition 
that a say-on-diversity requirement would help make companies 
accountable to shareholders in terms of their commitment to meaningful 
gender diversity in the boardroom. A say-on-diversity vote would help 
address concerns that the existing disclosure requirements fail to ensure that 
shareholders, particularly large and influential ones, are provided with the 
information they desire in order to make effective and informed decisions 
about financial investments.218 Importantly, given the dominance of the 
shareholder primacy model, such an approach would empower shareholders 
without running the risk of overregulation by the federal government into a 
domain better left either to the forces of market self-regulation or to the 
states. 
If shareholders were dissatisfied with the board’s policies, they could also 
choose to encourage the board to adopt discrete measures such as “the 
criteria used when recruiting directors, or the steps taken to develop senior 
executive talent,”219 or how the nominating committee’s consideration of 
diversity has impacted its recruitment process.220  
Notably, in its 2010 report on corporate governance policy, Institutional 
Shareholder Services, Inc., recommended votes in favor of shareholder 
proposals requesting “reports on efforts to diversify the board” and, on a 
case-by-case basis, in favor of proposals requesting increases in “the 
                                                            
217 See id. 
218 See Comment Letter from Broome & Hazen, supra note 178, at 2. 
219 Boardroom Diversity, GOVERNANCE NEWSL., June 2011, at 3 (identifying key 
elements that the FRC considered including in the Corporate Governance Code’s 
diversity provisions). 
220 Comment Letter from Broome & Hazen, supra note 178, at 1. 
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representation of women and minorities on the board.”221 Such 
recommendations support the notion that shareholders can effectively hold 
corporations accountable for implementing meaningful policies aimed at 
promoting gender diversity in the boardroom. 
B. Would It Hold Up? 
Given the current trend of increased regulation by the SEC (e.g., SOX 
and Dodd-Frank), the SEC would arguably be acting well within its scope 
of authority if it adopted a more robust regulation, as described in the 
preceding section. Nonetheless, particularly in light of the 2008 financial 
crisis, it is quite informative to take a step back and consider the SEC’s 
origins and its mandate in order to contextualize the present day nature of 
the SEC’s authority as relevant to regulation of boardroom composition. 
1. The Creation of the SEC: “All We Ask of Them Is to Tell the 
Truth”222 
In the wake of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, Congress enacted the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the SEA of 1934.223 In a February 1934 message 
to the Senate, President Franklin D. Roosevelt underscored the need for 
federal regulation in order to eliminate securities market abuses: 
[O]utside the field of legitimate investment naked speculation has 
been made far too easy for those who could and for those who 
could not afford to gamble. . . . I therefore recommend to the 
                                                            
221 Practising Law Institute, supra note 160, at 524–25 (citing ISS’s U.S. Corporate 
Governance Policy: 2010 Updates). ISS is a leading provider of corporate governance 
solutions to the financial community. See About ISS, ISSGOVERNANCE.COM, 
http://www.issgovernance.com/about (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
222 H.R. 9323, 78 CONG. REC. 8160–8203 (May 7, 1934) (statement of Sen. Duncan U. 
Fletcher), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973) [hereinafter 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
223 The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Aug. 6, 2012) (Today, the SEA 
requires that all companies with “more than $10 million in assets whose securities are 
held by more than 500 owners must file annual and other periodic reports.”). 
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Congress the enactment of [the SEA] . . . for the protection of 
investors, for the safeguarding of values, and, so far as it may be 
possible, for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise, and 
destructive speculation.224 
Today, the importance of protecting the national welfare is reflected in 
the SEA’s introductory paragraph: because transactions in securities “are 
effected with a national public interest . . . it [is] necessary to provide for 
regulation and control of such transactions and of practices and matters 
related thereto . . . .”225 In general terms, the SEA identifies and prohibits 
certain types of conduct within the securities industry, including corporate 
reporting, proxy solicitations, tender offers, insider trading, and registration 
of exchanges, associations, and others.226 Importantly, the SEA also created 
the SEC, vesting it with broad enforcement and regulatory authority.227 
Initially, the SEA was to be administered by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC); however, the Senate ultimately prevailed in its desire to 
establish an independent commission.228 Senate discussions on this matter 
underscore the pioneering aims of the SEA and the marked importance of 
the commission responsible for enforcement of such broad aims. Describing 
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency’s rationale for 
recommending an independent commission, Committee Chairman Duncan 
U. Fletcher229 reported that those representing the exchanges argued that the 
                                                            
224 78 CONG. REC. 2264–2272 (Feb. 9, 1934) (statement of Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt), 
reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 222.  
225 S.E.A. 1934, § 2 (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf; see 
also Moore, supra note 140, at 85. 
226 The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 223. 
227 The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
228 78 CONG. REC. 10,248–10,269 (June 1, 1934), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 222; see also The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 223 
(“With this Act, Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission.”). 
229 Duncan U. Fletcher served as a Florida Senator with the Democratic Party from 1909 
until his death in 1936. Fletcher, Duncan Upshaw, BIOGUIDE.CONGRESS.GOV, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=F000200 (last visited Aug. 6, 
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administration of the SEA “ought to be handled by people who have 
knowledge of transactions involving the distribution and issuance of 
securities, and so forth,” and that the FTC lacked such experience.230 
Senator Alben W. Barkley added that the Committee on Banking and 
Currency was also motivated by the “public attention [that] would always 
be focused upon [a] separate commission,” while, if administered by the 
FTC, enforcement of the SEA “would have to be a sort of lean-to under the 
Commissions’ original activities.”231 Hence, the SEC was seen as 
advantageous not only because of the expertise of its commissioners, but 
also because of the degree to which the public would be able to hold such a 
free-standing commission accountable to its mandate.232 
While the SEA was aimed at correcting abuses, restoring confidence, and 
establishing “an efficient, adequate, open, and free market for the purchase 
and sale of securities,” the associated mandatory disclosure of “all material 
facts . . . essential to give the investor an adequate opportunity to evaluate 
his investment” initially evoked some degree of criticism.233 Critics argued 
that corporations were being put to “enormous expense and trouble,” and 
that the federal government was “inquiring into affairs into which [it had] 
no business to examine.”234 Senator Fletcher powerfully countered such 
critiques: “What right have brokers to appeal to the public to buy their 
                                                                                                                              
2012). He chaired the Committee on Banking and Currency from 1932 until 1936, id., 
serving as Vice Chairman and then Chairman of the “Pecora Committee.” Subcommittee 
on Senate Resolutions 84 and 234 (The Pecora Committee), SENATE.GOV, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/Pecora.htm (last 
visited Aug. 6, 2012). The Pecora Committee was charged with investigating the causes 
of the Wall Street Crash of 1929. Id. It initiated the reform process that led to passage of 
the Securities Act of 1922 and the SEA of 1934, which is also referred to as the 
“Fletcher-Rayburn bill.” Id. 
230 H.R. 9323, 78 CONG. REC. 8160–8203 (May 7, 1934), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 222. 
231 Id. 
232 See id. 
233 H.R. 9323, 78 CONG. REC. 8160–8203 (May 7, 1934) (statement of Sen. Duncan U. 
Fletcher), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 222. 
234 Id.  
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securities if they are not willing to tell the truth about those securities? That 
is the whole proposition, and all we ask of them is to tell the truth.”235 
2. The SEC’s Present-Day Authority: Corporate Governance 
As is the case with all agencies, the SEC’s rulemaking power is limited 
by its mandate.236 The US Supreme Court has specified that SEC rules 
“cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress.”237 
Furthermore, while courts have typically upheld disclosure-related 
regulations, which are generally considered to be procedural matters, they 
have been reticent to uphold laws that directly implicate substantive 
matters, which have typically been governed by state corporate law.238 Over 
the last twenty years, there appears to have been an increasing struggle to 
define the scope of the SEC’s rulemaking authority.239 
In Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission, the US 
Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit invalidated a SEC rule barring self-
regulatory organizations (SROs)240 from listing corporations that took 
corporate action that had “the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparately 
reducing the per share voting rights of [existing common stockholders].”241 
The court reasoned that the SEA “cannot be understood to include 
regulation of an issue that is so far beyond matters of disclosure (such as are 
regulated under section 14 of the SEA), and of the management and 
                                                            
235 H.R. 9323, 78 CONG. REC. 8160–8203 (May 7, 1934), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 222. 
236 Timothy De Lizza, Incoherency of American Corporate Governance and the Need for 
Federal Standards, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1111, 1135 (2007). 
237 Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
238 Id. (noting, however, that the distinction between “procedural” and “substantive” law 
is “an increasingly outmoded view”). 
239 Id. 
240 SROs include national securities exchanges and national securities associations. Bus. 
Roundtable v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
241 Id. (quoting Voting Rights Listing Standards; Disenfranchisement Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 
26,376, 26,394 (1988) (“Final Rule”), codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1990)). 
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practices of self-regulatory organizations, and that is concededly a part of 
corporate governance traditionally left to the states.”242 Professor Roberta S. 
Karmel explains that Congress gave the SEC power over voting procedure, 
rather than substantive control of voting power, because “Congress believed 
that so long as investors received enough information, shareholder voting 
could work . . . .”243 Nonetheless, in Business Roundtable, the court 
acknowledged the existence of a “murky area between substance and 
procedure.”244 
Recent developments in federal regulation of corporate governance 
matters, including SOX and Dodd-Frank, can be seen as increasing the 
SEC’s regulatory power in such murky areas. Courts today may be wary of 
interpreting the SEC’s mandate narrowly given that SOX “has preempted 
state law relating to certain aspects of executive compensation and has 
broadened the SEC’s overall powers.”245 Professor Karmel views SOX as a 
major increase in the scope of the SEC’s regulatory power: “The SEC now 
has the leverage to impose its model of corporate governance-a board of 
independent directors serving as a check on the CEO; a regulated CFO; and 
auditors and attorneys who must divide their allegiance to their clients with 
an allegiance to the SEC-on SEC registered corporations.”246 
                                                            
242 Id. at 408. 
243 Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and 
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 
128 (2005). Roberta S. Karmel is the Centennial Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law 
School, and a former SEC Commissioner and New York Stock Exchange Director; she 
has published widely on securities regulation and international securities law. Roberta 
Carmel, BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL, http://www.brooklaw.edu/faculty/directory/ 
facultymember/biography.aspx?id=roberta.karmel (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
244 Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411. 
245 De Lizza, supra note 236, at 1137. 
246 Karmel, supra note 243, at 143 (Arguing, in part, that “the SEC is an agency with a 
very long institutional memory that has always acquired more power in response to crisis 
and scandal, and the future use it may make of the additional power it has acquired 
pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley is unknown.”). 
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Dodd-Frank involved additional corporate law changes, introducing more 
matters of internal corporate governance into federal law.247 While SOX 
required independent directors on the audit committee, Dodd-Frank added a 
requirement that boards have a compensation committee, and that such 
committee be composed of independent directors.248 With respect to 
executive compensation, enhanced disclosure is required as is a nonbinding 
shareholder “say-on-pay” vote.249 Another Dodd-Frank provision requires 
public companies to disclose split jobs, employing a “comply or explain” 
approach.250 
To date, the courts have struck down a single SEC rule—Rule 14a-11—
promulgated pursuant to Dodd-Frank “authorization.”251 Dodd-Frank 
authorizes SEC rules “requiring public companies to include nominees 
submitted by shareholders.”252 Rule 14a-11 required companies to include 
in their proxy materials “the name of a person or persons nominated by a 
[qualifying] shareholder or group of shareholders for election to the board 
of directors.”253 In adopting Rule 14a-11, the SEC concluded that the rule 
“could create potential benefits of improved board and company 
performance and shareholder value sufficient to justify [its] potential 
costs.”254 The US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, however, found that 
the SEC’s promulgation of Rule 14a-11 was “arbitrary and capricious and 
not in accordance with law”; underscoring the SEC’s obligation to 
“consider the effect of a new rule upon ‘efficiency, competition, and capital 
                                                            
247 O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 187, at 218. 
248 Id. (The stock exchanges also require that boards “have an overall majority of 
independent directors and that the nominating/governance committee, as well as the audit 
and compensation committee . . . be made up of independent directors.”) 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 See Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
252 O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 187, at 218. 
253 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1147 (The rule applied to all companies “subject to the 
Exchange Act proxy rules, including . . . investment compan[ies] . . . registered under the 
Investment Act of 1940 (ICA).”). 
254 Id. (quoting 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,761/1 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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formation,”255 the court reasoned that the SEC failed to “apprise itself—and 
hence the public and Congress—of the economic consequences of a 
proposed regulation.”256 
Considering the broad reach of SOX and Dodd-Frank, the SEC’s current 
regulatory authority appears to be well supported. While the decision to 
strike Rule 14a-11 serves as an important reminder that the SEC’s authority 
is not without bounds—arbitrary regulations will be disallowed, and 
potential economic consequences must be taken into consideration257—a 
nonbinding say-on-diversity shareholder vote would fall well within the 
established scope of the SEC’s regulatory power. 
IV. ITEM FOR FUTURE RESEARCH: POSITIVE LABOR MARKET 
EFFECTS? 
This section undertakes a preliminary investigation of additional positive 
labor market benefits that may flow from increased gender diversity in the 
boardroom. A 2008 study surveying forty-three countries revealed, 
“countries with a higher representation of women on boards are more likely 
to have women in senior management and more equal ratios of male-to-
female pay.”258 Similarly, the FRC has noted that “boards with no, or very 
limited, female membership may . . . offer little encouragement to aspiration 
among female employees.”259 
First, this section discusses the inherent conflict between professional 
work and childrearing within our economic structure. Second, it considers 
the possibility that women directors might leverage their capacity for 
empathy in order to ameliorate such structure. Undoubtedly, the interaction 
                                                            
255 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 78w(a)(2), 80a-2(c)). 
256 Id. (quoting Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 412 F.3d 133, 
1444 (D.C. Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
257 See id. 
258 Terjesen et al., supra note 57, at 324. 
259 FEEDBACK STATEMENT, supra note 25. 
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between boardroom composition, empathy, and economic structure is an 
area for further research. 
A. Worker and Mother: A False Dichotomy of Economics? 
Professor Douglas M. Branson writes: 
Corporate America seems to regard child bearing and child rearing 
as just a lifestyle choice that some women make, just as other 
women dedicate leisure time to improving their tennis game or to 
training for a marathon. Bearing children and raising them well, 
however, is not just another lifestyle choice. It is the source of 
human capital, a sufficient supply of which is critical to the society 
as a whole.260 
In terms of workplace equality, it appears that motherhood drastically 
reduces a woman’s prospects of achieving such elusive equality. While 
childless women earn 90 percent of the pay of men, mothers earn only 60 
percent of the pay of fathers.261 The failure of corporations to retain and 
promote qualified female employees—what some refer to as women’s 
“opting-out” of the labor market—is costly to each individual and society as 
whole.262 At the same time, there is an inherent clash between “our ideals at 
work” and “our ideals for family life.”263 
In an influential New York Times article, “The Opt-Out Revolution,” Lisa 
Belkin points out that many employers do recognize that corporate entities 
benefit in the long run by offering flexible policies, such as maternity leave 
and extended part-time work, thereby successfully retaining employees over 
the course of their long-term careers.264 Flexibility plays a key role in the 
                                                            
260 DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, THE LAST MALE BASTION: GENDER AND THE CEO SUITE IN 
AMERICA’S PUBLIC COMPANIES 151 (2010) (emphasis added). 
261 Joan Williams, Our Economy of Mothers and Others: Women and Economics 
Revisited, 5 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 411, 416 (2002) (citing Bureau of Labor statistics). 
262 ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 39 (2001). 
263 Williams, supra note 261, at 417. 
264 Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 
42, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/26/magazine/26WOMEN.html? 
pagewanted=all. 
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attainment of a more balanced labor market in which parents can devote 
energy to childrearing without sacrificing professional development.265 
While female employees, particularly mothers, would most certainly benefit 
from more flexible policies, male employees would as well. Interestingly, a 
study on flexible work schedules revealed that men and women use flexible 
schedules at approximately the same rates—26.7 percent of women and 
28.1 percent of men.266 
Company surveys reveal that employees generally rate flexible work 
arrangements and work-life balance as being “extremely important.”267 
Furthermore, one study comparing organizations with high and low levels 
of flexibility reported benefits to organizations with higher levels of 
flexibility in terms of job engagement, commitment, and satisfaction, as 
well as employee retention.268 In spite of the “common sense” of flexible 
policies, corporations have failed to broadly institute them.269 Belkin sees 
the persistence of rigid policies as stemming from the fact that “male 
managers and supervisors tend to see not the long- but the short-run 
view.”270 
An additionally problematic piece of the puzzle is that standard measures 
of economic productivity fail to account for a whole range of activities 
integral to our day-to-day well-being and to the creation of our next-
                                                            
265 See BRANSON, supra note 260, at 152 (citing CRITTENDEN, supra note 262, at 256–
74); Joan Williams, Cynthia Thomas Calvert & Holly Green Cooper, Better on Balance? 
The Corporate Counsel Work/Life Report, 10 WM . & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 367, 422–
32 (2004)). 
266 CATALYST, WORK-LIFE: PREVALENCE, UTILIZATION, AND BENEFITS 2 (Oct. 29, 
2011), (on file with author) (citing Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Workers on Flexible and Shift Schedules in 2004 Summary (July 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/flex.nr0.htm). 
267 Id. at 6. 
268 Id. (citing JAMES T. BOND, ELLEN GALINSKY & E. JEFFREY HILL, WHEN WORK 
WORKS: A STATUS REPORT ON WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY (2004), available at 
http://familiesandwork.org/3w/research/downloads/status.pdf).  
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generation of human capital. Ann Crittenden, a former New York Times 
reporter, summarizes this dilemma: “Child rearing and household 
management are considered to have no economic or job-enabling value.”271 
Interestingly, the well-known economic measure, Gross National Product 
(GNP), was not developed until the 1930s,272 during the same time period in 
which Congress legislated the SEA and created the SEC.273 In his 1934 
report to Congress, Simon Kuznets, the Nobel Prize-winning statistician 
responsible for developing GNP, warned that “the welfare of a nation” 
could “scarcely be inferred” from GNP.274 
This is an area for further exploration. Ultimately, it is the board of 
directors that wields the power to set broad company policies, including 
those related to employment. In this respect, the power of managers and 
supervisors, which Belkin discusses, is directly circumscribed by corporate 
policies.275 One cannot help but ask whether a critical mass of women 
directors might influence the labor market in ways that would reduce 
gender-based inequities. 
B. The Impact of Women Directors: “Signaling” and Empathy 
There has been a good deal of discussion on the “signaling” function of 
women in positions of leadership.276 Specifically, with regard to the 
                                                            
271 CRITTENDEN, supra note 262, at 5. 
272 Id. at 66. 
273 In 1934, Congress passed the SEA, which created the SEC. The Investor's Advocate: 
How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital 
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274 CRITTENDEN, supra note 262, at 65–66. 
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ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2012) (“The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be 
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276 See, e.g., Terjesen et al., supra note 57, at 324. Some argue that “female board 
member presence signals that a corporation values the success of its women.” Id. (citing 
Diana Bilimoria, Building the Business Case for Women Corporate Directors, in WOMEN 
ON CORPORATE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES AND 
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corporate arena, studies show that “the more women there are in director 
positions, the greater the number of women in senior management 
positions.”277 At least one study has found “a positive relationship between 
female corporate board members and the following: number of women 
officers; number of women officers holding line jobs; presence of a critical 
mass of women officers; women officers with high-ranking or ‘clout’ titles; 
and women among the top corporate earners.”278 
There are additional arguments that gender diversity benefits 
corporations and their shareholders due to inherent or acculturated 
differences in the genders. It has been suggested, for example, that 
“diversity increases creativity and innovation as these characteristics are not 
randomly distributed in the population, but tend to vary systematically with 
demographic variables such as gender.”279 While such arguments are 
potentially problematic—either because of their empirical ambiguity or 
because of their potential for misuse—they may also enable corporations to 
better leverage the available pool of human capital. 
One particularly interesting argument, which stems from psychological 
literature, relates to women’s capacity for empathy. Assuming that women 
have a comparative advantage in terms of their capacity for empathy, 
women directors might be inclined to advocate for more flexible corporate 
employment policies (here, also assuming a critical mass of women 
directors). 
Within the field of psychology, empathy is divided into two groupings: 
cognitive, which involves “perspective taking,”280 and emotional, which 
                                                            
277 DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
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WELLINGTON, BE YOUR OWN MENTOR 37 (2001)). 
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involves “concern for the other.”281 In other words, “[c]ognitive role-taking 
consists of a primarily intellectual process and involves social skills and 
social perceptiveness, whereas emotional empathy consists of a more basic 
or ‘primitive’ level of interpersonal process whereby . . . one responds with 
emotions similar to those of others who are present.”282 
Numerous studies have found that women score higher than men on tests 
of empathy.283 A recent Spanish study employed a longitudinal design in an 
adolescent population to research whether women have a greater “empathic 
disposition” as compared with men.284 Girls scored higher both in terms of 
cognitive and emotional empathy.285 The study concluded, “sex differences 
are not just found in the emotional realm of empathy but also in the capacity 
of understanding the other person’s state and situation.”286 Such finding is 
noteworthy with respect to boardroom diversity because directors’ exercise 
of cognitive empathy might be particularly impactful in shaping corporate 
employment policies. 
To date, there is at least some evidence that women directors “feel that 
their presence makes the board more sensitive to women’s issues.”287 Given 
such findings on women’s “empathic disposition,” it would be interesting to 
pursue further research on how such disposition affects the nature of 
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CONCLUSION 
This article is intended to spark debate and further research on the topic 
of gender diversity in the boardroom. Despite significant educational and 
professional attainment, within the boardrooms of America’s Fortune 500 
companies, women represent a mere 16.1 percent of directors.288 Just three 
companies in the S&P 500 Index have boards on which women directors 
hold more than 40 percent of board seats,289 while forty-seven companies 
have no female directors at all.290 
In leveraging both interdisciplinary research and experiences from 
abroad, this article has sought to develop a more holistic picture of the 
factors contributing to the low ratio of women to men on corporate boards. 
The hope is that such a contextualized discussion of women directors will 
foster support for increased gender diversity amongst a broad cross section 
of individuals and organizations. 
Focusing on the “business case” for gender diversity in the boardroom, it 
is apparent that meaningful gender diversity is advantageous in economic 
terms. Research into critical mass theory suggests that the male-to-female 
director ratio must be increased significantly in order for corporations, 
shareholders, and the overall economy to reap the rewards of gender 
diversity in the boardroom.  
Particularly since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been renewed debate 
and substantially increased SEC regulation focused on the securities market. 
Building on the SEC’s 2010 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, and 
considering both the SEC’s origins and its present day regulatory role, this 
article suggests a more robust version of the current disclosure 
requirements. Such an amended disclosure requirement ought to (1) define 
                                                            
288 STATISTICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 5 (citing POPULATION SURVEY, supra note 5). 
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“diversity” to explicitly include gender diversity, (2) require corporations to 
have a diversity policy in place and to disclose such policy to shareholders, 
and (3) potentially require a nonbinding “say-on-diversity” shareholder 
vote. The direct benefits of such an enhanced requirement would include 
increased corporate accountability to investors and greater likelihood that 
corporations would realize the increased economic gains associated with 
gender diversity in the boardroom. Finally, in terms of indirect benefits, 
there is the possibility that such a requirement could lead to broader societal 
benefits in terms of positive labor market effects. 
 
